Tuesday, May 17, 2005

Progressives and Religion: Response to a Response

My friend Trond Jacobsen has always been more tough-minded than me, and his eloquence makes his forcefulness go down easier. But in this instance, it is my turn to be tough-minded, in insisting that we not set up such rigid dichotomies between science and faith. Neither history or politics compels us to do so, and the false consciousness he attacks is the result of what particular religious institutions do in particular historical circumstances, due to particular social contradictions.

The reason those revolutionary priests in Nicaragua made such decisive contributions to their communities, the reason their contributions outweighed those of orthodox Marxists or other progressives in the United States (by and large, at least) is that what they did had more social weight; to use a rather worrisome term, they were in the thick of history. Circumstances existed where they could rationally, and passionately, choose a practical convergence of faith and method, acknowledging humanity's objective circumstances as well as subjective, problematic yearnings.

Maybe all spirituality is just bunk. Maybe it's all just a bad bit of cheese we ate the night before, as Scrooge said. Maybe it's false consciousness explained away by a radical anthropology. If that's the case, I can only answer:

1-that it will not go away just because a few people are brave enough to declare themselves atheists;
2-that that same irrational faith will and does make its way into the science of atheists, even some self-identified Marxists (it will go underneath their consciousness and take a different, and if history is any guide, possibly nefarious form);
3-that religion, superstition, spiritualism, what have you will possibly, then, go away when we reach a particular state of emancipatory development, but in the meantime, see #1.

Trond argues that humanist religions are weak-willed religions that, while not being oppressive per se, are distractions whose contributions to progressive politics are "exogenous to their more metaphysical assumptions." Of course, in the very rational language of academic debate, his argument is pure defense. These "softline" religions don't make things even remotely worse, and in quite many instances make things better, sometimes in spite of their adherents' faith, and (whether we socialist eggheads want to admit it or not) sometimes because of it.

But beyond that, I'm not sure what type of spiritual community he's attacking. I can only speak for my own experience among them, but Unitarians and Universalists are far from "crystal sniffers." A UU fellowship might not turn a crystal sniffer away, but you can be sure the sniffer would get a good dose of rational criticism, a lot of questions, and along the way, a social conscience and lots of training in social action. It's far more likely that, in the midst of this religious rationality, the sniffer would discover that crystal sniffing isn't all that useful, that it's a rather shallow kind of fetishization, and that there are more constructive (and probably less expensive) ways to access one's subjective yearnings.

I fully agree that humanity, life in general, cannot survive without a huge dose of science. My disagreement comes in my holding that the wholesale abandonment of faith is itself irrational and, I would think, unscientific. This is not only because for the past hundred years, the parameters and rules of science have expanded to include hitherto excluded elements of subjectivity, uncertainty, and (in praise of Douglas Adams) infinite improbability, although these shifts are important. More than this, it is because I am unconvinced that something as intrinsic to human consciousness as mystical, ineffable connectivity is really the cause of the kind of paralysis and oppressive apologia Trond rightly laments.

If Che Guervara, who certainly proved capable of killing when he held it necessary, can say in all earnestness that the revolutionary is motivated by great feelings of love, I can reasonably hold that spirituality, far from being the inevitable handmaiden of oppressive religion, can motivate us to do great things, very rational things. You won't find too many people out there with stronger feelings than mine about the separation of church and state or people's responsibility to check their metaphysics at the door before participating in political life. And I would not exempt any religious hierarchy from the materialist criticism I apply to all social hierarchy. But ultimately, religion should belong to the people. That doesn't preclude criticizing it, scrapping it, changing it, making fun of it, forcing it to be accountable to rational human conduct. It just means I'm not going to talk about abolishing it. That's a decision the children of the revolution can make. Maybe they won't need to. As Engels said in the context of whether a socialist society would choose to limit population growth: Leave it up to them. They will presumably be at least as smart as we are.

The truest statement in his reply is that "faith and religious and metaphysics function in the current social order in a net regressive fashion." I can't help but think this betrays an acknowledgment, however grudging, that this question is much more about the social order than "religion." I think we have a better chance of turning people away from brutal and hateful (or socially regressive) enactment of their religious beliefs by acknowledging the sublime than by sneering at it.

7 comments:

Anonymous said...

I'd like some proof of Mr. Jacobsen's claim that, "Religious belief is either strong and wholly regressive, or 'weak' (in the terms I have here sketched) and makes positive contributions exogenous to their more metaphysical assumptions."

The on-going National Study of Youth and Religion (under the direction of Christian Smith at UNC Chapel Hill) indicates that higher teenage religiosity is associated with (a) more favorable life outcomes (by measures that should be largely uncontroversial among parents) and (b) greater concern for social justice (e.g., in racial and economic matters). Statistically, unbelievers make a rather poor showing. (And they have done the multivariate analysis to control for economic status.) Essentially, the *more* relgious a teen, the better the life outcome and the greater the concern about (and, by some measures, actions in furtherance of) social justice.

This study may not be the only or best evidence on the question. But it's at least relevant to Mr. Jacobsen's unsubstantiated claim about the allegedly harmful and regressive effects of religion.

Scott

Matt J Stannard said...

Obviously this is somewhat academic because I disagree with Trond, and the scope of our disagreement has to do with religiosity and progressive politics. I searched the youth and religion site in vain for any data relevant to the argument on this blog. I can't find anything linking religious activity with a concern for social justice. Please (a) provide me some access to that data and (b) define, or point me to the study's definition of, social justice.

There is a correlation between religious activity and community service/volunteering--
http://www.youthandreligion.org/news/6-4-2002.html . However, the findings do not DEFINE community service or volunteering. We don't really know what they're volunteering for, and certainly this cannot be automatically connected with participation in progressive politics. At least one part of the findings speak of this volunteering occuring in the context of religious youth groups. Does that mean that the youths volunteer together as members of church-sponsored youth groups? I'm not sure that is flawless data if your contention is that religious youths have a greater PROPENSITY to volunteer. And besides that, one might volunteer in a great many organizations that are not politically progressive, which means that while these findings are interesting, and while volunteering is generally a good thing (unless you're volunteering for the KKK or something), this data is irrelevant to Trond's argument, or my response.

The notion that religious activity equates to more favorable (apolitical) life outcomes is likewise irrelevant to our argument.

I might ask this, tongue only partially in cheek, Scott: If the study found that teens who were Satanists had "more positive life outcomes" and a greater tendency to stay out of trouble, get good grades, and do the dishes regularly, would you convert your family to the Church of Satan?

matt

Matt J Stannard said...

Let me explain further what I mean: Trond argues that the positive/progressive contributions of liberal churchgoers are not intrinsic to their metaphysical underpinnings, and further than those metaphysics are a distraction from even greater levels of political consciousness and commitment.

I answer that, because spirituality is inevitable, and because the political role of spirituality is contingent upon superstructural factors, his first argument isn't a "winner," and that his second argument is dubious.

Scott answers Trond by citing empirical data that religious youth are better people, including in ways Trond and I might find valuable--concern for others, concern for social justice.

What I am trying to say, and didn't say very well in my last response, is that Scott's argument doesn't really answer the question of the intrinsic relationship between spirituality and politics. At best it proves that people might be motivated to various particular social actions by their membership in a religious group. Nor does it preclude the risk that such social actions may be oppressive in some way, though I admit this is largely a question of ideological orientation.

But I think we ought to remember that, although Scott and Trond and I might disagree on the political implications of particular social actions here in late capitalism, we'd have all agreed that Nazism was bad. The question for Scott is how to stop the political excesses of religion, its authoritization of public (and perhaps private?) life.

matt

Anonymous said...

Matt,

I have no complaint with the way you frame the issue, so far as it goes. However, Trond's claims struck me as being much broader. Firstly, that religion (or faith), if "strong" (by which I assume he means something along the lines of dogmatic, strapped with silly metaphysics, etc.), is "wholly regressive." And then, secondly, that to the extent that "weak" belief (e.g., that of UUs, liberal Christians, or many Reform Jews?) is associated with not-so-regressive tendencies, it is *despite* the baggage of faith, rather than because of it.

Your restatement of the issue seems to focus on the latter question: whether a "weak" faith facilitates, hobbles, or is merely irrelevant to progressive action. My response, however, was focusing on the first claim: that "strong" religious belief is connected with regressive action. That seems to be a fact question. Answering it doesn't end the discussion, by any means. There's still the "causal" question, as you point out in your most recent comment (which is an expansion of the second issue Trond raised and with which you're engaging him in the post above).

So, my question is, why should we believe that "strong" religious belief is wholly regressive? It's a widely held conviction in some circles. And it's easy to come up with anecdotal evidence in support of the claim. But is there hard data to support it? I don't know. But it's something I'd *need* to know before taking Trond's larger argument too seriously.

Going back to your first comment in response to mine, as I initially acknowledged, the NSYR "may not be the only or best evidence on the question." But it's something (and something more than anecdotal). Let me flesh that out a little more.

The relationship between positive life outcomes and "progressive politics" perhaps isn't as obvious as I assume. But, it seems to me, the goal of most progressive policies is, in one form or another, a positive life outcome for individuals. Living wage laws, drug rehabilitation programs, and civil rights laws, for instance, are all intended to improve the quality of individuals' lives. To the extent that religious belief and activity produce similar results to those aspired to and sometimes obtained by secular progressive policies, religion/faith should get some credit. That would seem to challenge the claim that religion is wholly regressive. So, what kind of life outcomes do I have in mind?

According to the NSYR, religiously "devoted" teens are far less likely to smoke, drink, use marijuana, cut class, get low grades in school, and get suspended from school. (The study categorizes the teens, based on their religious activity, as "devoted," "regular," "sporadic," and "disengaged.") "Devoted" teens are far less likely to engage in sexual behavior (which, though the study doesn't directly address it, probably impacts incidence of venereal disease, unwanted pregnancies, and abortion). They're less likely to be depressed or feel isolated and angry. They tend to have more peaceful relationships with their families and others around them. Not all of these outcomes are equally relevant to progressive concerns. But there's more confluence than not. If an after school program intended to keep kids off drugs, out of gangs, and in school is progressive, why isn't a religious program that shares such objectives?

As for social beliefs and action: "Disengaged" teens tend to be much more morally relativistic, more likely to resolve moral dilemmas in ways that they feel will help them (as individuals) get ahead or be happy. Much is made of the supposedly harmful black and white, absolutist morality of religionists. But is moral relativism, steered by individual self-interest, a better foundation for progressive attitudes and action?

"Devoted" teens are significantly more likely than "disengaged" teens to "personally care about the needs of poor people in the United States"--69% to 33%. They're more likely to care about the elderly--64% to 31%. They're more likely to care about "equality between different racial groups"--62% to 39%. (The numbers are controlled for age, sex, race, region of residence, parental marital status, parental education, and family income.) Concern for the poor, the elderly, and racial equality does not *necessarily* express itself in the ways you, Trond, or even I might favor. But the concern is there. And, if the "disengaged" are coming up so short in concern, why would a sensible progressive want to add to the ranks of the disengaged?

Some other measures... "Devoted" teens are more likely than the "disengaged" to have given more than $20 of their own money to an organization or cause (65% to 21%). They are (as you noted in your response) more likely to have regularly or occasionally done non-mandatory volunteer work or community service (50% to 25%). They're more likely to have done "volunteer or service work that brought [them] into a lot of direct contact with people of a different race, religion, or economic class" (31% to 19%). They're more likely to have helped the homeless or needy not through an organization (20% to 4%).

All of these numbers are taken from the book "Soul Searching," in which the authors present and interpret some of the data from the study. (Most of these numbers are from Chapter 7.) It's an interesting book which, you might be surprised to hear, levels some sharp criticisms against the way in which the American social context, including mass-consumer capitalism, shapes teenage religiosity.

I don't want to place inordinate weight on these numbers, as I said from the outset. But I do think the study is relevant to the question of the relationship between religion and the development of attitudes and practices that are, at least superficially, in harmony with many progressive aims. It doesn't answer the causation question (or "intrinsic relationship," as you put it). It doesn't settle the question of whether faith produces *net* benefits to progressive causes. But it suggests that the claim that strong faith is "wholly regressive" is at least controversial, if not false. (Of course, Trond's comments were directed to you personally. That he didn't produce some evidence for the claim may simply indicate that he didn't think it was, as to you, a fact in controversy. He may have plenty of data to support the claim. If so, I'd be interested to see it.)

Now, for your parting questions:

1) If it could be shown that teenage Satanists had significantly better life outcomes, would I raise my kids as Satanists? Probably not. Pragmatism may not suffice to shake my own moral and metaphysical commitments (not to mention covenants). But I'd certainly be looking into the issue seriously, trying to figure out why the Satanists are succeeding and why my own faith is failing me in a matter of critical importance. To bring it back to the topic at hand, if I were an irreligious progressive, I would be (a) trying to figure out why religious faith appears to be more connected (in some meaningful ways) with progressive attitudes and actions than unbelief is and (b) trying to figure out how I could work with religionists on issues of common concern. Taking an antagonistic stance towards religion or religionists strikes me as counterproductive.

2) How do we stop the political excesses of religion and its authoritization of public and private life? I share your assumption that it *should* be stopped, though not everyone does. But, skipping ahead of that question, I think we have quite a few effective mechanisms for limiting the political power of churches. Despite blips here and there, I think the trend in America is for even less intrusion of religion in the public sphere. It'll never go away. (Political issues are moral issues and morals are, more often than not, informed by religion. And I don't see any reason to think secular moral reasoning is superior to, or completely divorced from its roots in, the religious.) But I think it can be controlled to allow a broadly tolerant and pluralistic society.

Another question is how the progressive instincts of many religionists can be harnassed without ruffling the desired separation. Can it be done? Or must those instincts find their expression solely in the "private sector"?

Scott

Anonymous said...

Matt knows that even if I strongly disagree with some of his views this fact says nothing about my view of him as a close friend. Indeed, it is because I care about his views and respect them that I find value in engaging in this discussion, tough-minded or otherwise.

For the benefit of others who may read these exchanges, let me emphasize that I am not suggesting people do not have a right to engage in religious belief. Using hyperbole to crystallize my point here, I defend people’s right to believe all kinds of untrue things. This is only rational because I need similar courtesies from my peers to protect my right to believe in my own many dumb beliefs. I was even nearly moved to belief in miracles by my World Champion Boston Red Sox. While I cannot take up all the various points raised in the wake of my earlier response in this single post, perhaps I can clarify some key issues and address some of the particular points in the course of subsequent exchanges.

I wish to make clearer my core argument. The fact is was not adequately addressed in my judgment by Matt or others at The Underview may arise from my poor earlier articulation.

1. Over the next hundred years humanity will face highly-interconnected social, economic, ecological, and security problems that are intrinsic to current world system that are sure the threaten the continuation of life on this planet in anything resembling a humane social system. (I identified a number of these in my earlier post and doubt we really disagree on this point so...).
2. Successfully meeting these challenges requires the application of human knowledge guided by the core principles of scientific approach: natural observation, experimentation, repeatability, etc. (again, I assume no disagreement).
3. In the United States we confront a surplus of religiosity that in the current political context places us on the brink of a theocracy and which already is destructive to the application of sound science in the United States, the keystone in the imperial arch.
4. In the specific political context American progressives now confront, what is needed is strong and well articulated demonstration of public support for secularism and the necessity of science for solving at these big problems. Whatever our specific religious beliefs, the message needed now to push back the theocrats is a loud, unified statement in support of rational scientific approaches to evaluating these challenges and addressing them.
5. In the specific political context American progressives now confront, to valorize the role of faith is to cloud judgment about these important issues and helps create a context in which the hard right seizes the rising legitimacy of faith in the public square to more successfully impose their views with disastrous consequences for all. Rising political legitimacy for faith serves the theocrats, not those who agree with Rev. Gustavo Gutierrez.
6. Conversely, even a partial success in raising the bar on the application of faith to matters of public policy will help check this realignment and provide space for the maturation and development of “progressive religiosity” to challenge those folks in that arena.

Of course these are the products of particular historical circumstances and social contradictions. The motivating thrust of my comments, and the core of my view, far from reflecting a rigid dichotomy in which one must choose between religious or spiritual faith on one hand and science and rationality on the other is here much more limited (though I am an atheist and have for myself made this “rigid” distinction.) When they in fact collide (i.e., when conditions hold the two in conflict), faith should give way because a) it is, well, false, or more accurately not sufficiently “true” in ways that are actionable; and b) not helpful to addressing the key questions which dominate global problems.

Scott, even if religious people are happy about themselves and have lower divorce rates, drug use, etc., this is really not that meaningful if ocean ecosystems collapse, and 2 billion humans starve because of faith a god will save us from climate change. Another time I will argue that these powerful salutary effects are more the product of /any/ deeply held commitment to collective action and mobilization on basis of perceived shared interests, than the product of religious dogma. There is no insight in Jesus, only in working closely with other like minded people to construct a desired social space and reality.

MATT: ”The reason those revolutionary priests in Nicaragua made such decisive contributions to their communities, the reason their contributions outweighed those of orthodox Marxists or other progressives in the United States (by and large, at least) is that what they did had more social weight; to use a rather worrisome term, they were in the thick of history.”

My crucial belief is that these contributions were exogenous to their religious beliefs. It is because they acted on the opportunity to assist people they cared about.

I get your point that they were situated in such a manner to effect more significant revolutionary change. I concede this was because of their commitment to liberation theology. But what ultimately drove Somoza from power and provided the measure of progress that did occur in revolutionary Nicaragua was a powerful revolutionary movement directly tied to improving the lives of the broad population, not faith in Jesus. I believe these were impressive figures who did contribute more to improving the world than most North American leftists. But my claim was not like they caused this importation revolution. On the contrary, as I am sure you will concede, these are marginal or exceptional cases. The role of their particular religious institution, the Catholic Church, is one of nearly unmitigated horror for centuries, matched in ferocity perhaps only by the Evangelical Protestant Montt in Guatemala in early 1980’s. A few Tomas Borge’s does not absolve this legacy.

Yes many Nicaraguans and Sandinistas were “believers” and, yes, many were inspired by an ethical framework they drew from their faith or from certain individual priests, but it was the opportunity to improve their lives that caused processes that unfolded on the surface with a religious element or hue. They were fighting for bread not Jesus.

The fact this type of pattern (at the most abstract level) occurs elsewhere in other spiritual contexts to me demonstrates the instrumental role of these beliefs in important social processes. It is not connected intrinsically to their content because of the variance in doctrines and religious beliefs.

To me this is an important fact that holds two important implications for our discussion.

1) These are all merely the products of human belief and faith; none are true or provable or facts (however you want to look at this), unlike say predictions about orbits, or the nutrient cycles of polar oceans.
2) Stripped of the power of being “True,” or “His Word” or whatever, and properly reduced to status as mere instrument of human belief, a valid question becomes what is the veracity of their content and how applicable is it to solving problem X?

Even at their best, contributions stem from the fact of holding beliefs collectively, not their religious content, let alone their veracity. This debate is not about whether progressives should support collective belief systems and working together within these frameworks. It is ultimately about the optimal content of that collectivist framework. Science is better than faith, at least for those problems of interest I have identified and which I hold are most at risk from too great an acceptance of faith in the public square.

More stridently, but in the interest in driving the discussion forward, I fail to see evidence for the existence of the metaphysical, “spiritual,” what have you, those things in which the religious have faith. I see lots of evidence for naturalistic (“scientific”) explanations for most of the ecological, economic, and social problems of greatest interest to me. Ether, fate, karma, angels, etc., will not drive away those demons who take food from your plate and poison your villages’ water.

MATT: “Maybe all spirituality is just bunk. Maybe it's all just a bad bit of cheese we ate the night before, as Scrooge said. Maybe it's false consciousness explained away by a radical anthropology.”

While crudely put this is, in essence, my view.

MATT: “1-that it will not go away just because a few people are brave enough to declare themselves atheists;”

They will need to be persuaded and this is what I am attempting to help accomplish. My goal stops short of changing their religious views, as wrongheaded as I might find them, but rather demands that science rules the scientific questions implicated by these various global challenges. I am not saying only ‘scientific issues’ are important.

MATT: “2-that that same irrational faith will and does make its way into the science of atheists, even some self-identified Marxists (it will go underneath their consciousness and take a different, and if history is any guide, possibly nefarious form);”

Agreed.

A huge motivation for my distrust of faith is my dislike of religions and the hard line (so to speak) I take here is a function of my visceral dislike of authority and centralized power sustained through illusions (religious or otherwise). You know my anarchist foundations.

Our apparent disagreement relates to the conclusion we should draw from the ubiquity of irrationality. You throw up your hands and say, oh well, guess faith is the best way forward because it seems inevitable (forgive my hyperbole). I say, critique, exposure, debate, and negotiation within the penumbra of science. In short, rationality is the answer to the irrationality you identify, not another irrationality or some blend of “useful” falsities and science.

MATT: “3-that religion, superstition, spiritualism, what have you will possibly, then, go away when we reach a particular state of emancipatory development, but in the meantime, see #1.”

I have no illusions that superstition, as you put it, will dissolve soon. This is no reason to disengage from the debate. My key argument is that they are false (speaking at the very abstract level of this discussion). Since we are not in a debate context, I believe such a conclusion, if true, is offense not mere defense, to use debate jargon. False is false, whether Unitarian or Assemblies of God or Buddha or Muhammed. False beliefs are no less so even when they motivate positive action. When this occurs within a religious context, what are the productive outcomes intrinsic to faith? For example, could not these very values emerge in the collective context of a workers’ council or whatever? What are the essential /religious/ contributions?

MATT: “I fully agree that humanity, life in general, cannot survive without a huge dose of science. My disagreement comes in my holding that the wholesale abandonment of faith is itself irrational and, I would think, unscientific.”

Please elaborate. I am not yet appreciating the rational arguments you make /for/ faith. You point to particular practices you have encountered meeting with some believers (finding “rational criticism, a lot of questions, and along the way, a social conscience and lots of training in social action”) that I wholeheartedly endorse, even in a religious context, but even more so in a “faithless” context. You do not explain the positive necessity of faith, but merely point out that people of faith do good things, something I do not and have never disputed. Generals do good things. CEOs do good things. Falwell does good things. Holding that faith is false consciousness is not inconsistent with these recognizing these possibilities.

MATT: “This is not only because for the past hundred years, the parameters and rules of science have expanded to include hitherto excluded elements of subjectivity, uncertainty, and (in praise of Douglas Adams) infinite improbability, although these shifts are important. More than this, it is because I am unconvinced that something as intrinsic to human consciousness as mystical, ineffable connectivity is really the cause of the kind of paralysis and oppressive apologia Trond rightly laments.”

1. There are those who hold that this trend has somewhat started to turn back toward more classical mechanistic assumptions (but that is not really of value here). I really think those who mine science for support for the metaphysical are stretching, hoping to bathe faith in the well deserved authority of science. Anyway...
2. “something as /intrinsic to human consciousness/ as mystical, ineffable connectivity” (emp. added) is a statement that I find
a) unproven by my friend Matt;
b) unprovable by the standards applied in science;
c) unrelated to the religious component of our discussion.

Sure, I love the “ineffable beauty” of a wildflower, the intricacies of nature, the joys of friendship, even a Richard Thompson ballad. What this has to do with the metaphysical or faith escapes me. It is my nature, if not human nature, to be awed by what we do not understand or cannot do.

Our debate is really about, what approach should we use to expand that range of our understanding of the world around us? Here, and I know this is a minority view, one with which you disagree, and pretty unpopular among some progressives at the moment searching for a way back to power, faith is not helpful, particularly for the most significant challenges we face.

MATT: “If Che Guervara, who certainly proved capable of killing when he held it necessary, can say in all earnestness that the revolutionary is motivated by great feelings of love, I can reasonably hold that spirituality, far from being the inevitable handmaiden of oppressive religion, can motivate us to do great things, very rational things.”

So can love for your fellow person, participation in labor actions, hope for you family, etc., etc., etc. There is no intrinsic benefit proven here.

MATT: “You won't find too many people out there with stronger feelings than mine about the separation of church and state or people's responsibility to check their metaphysics at the door before participating in political life. And I would not exempt any religious hierarchy from the materialist criticism I apply to all social hierarchy. But ultimately, religion should belong to the people. That doesn't preclude criticizing it, scrapping it, changing it, making fun of it, forcing it to be accountable to rational human conduct. It just means I'm not going to talk about abolishing it. “

Even when it is “false” in the sense I have applied here, that is, it is not an accurate account of the workings of the world?

We live in an age in which mysticism is ascendant generally along with theocratic political dominance while rationality and the application of science for the common good are in retreat.

I believe the two trends are connected. I see few actual benefits to religious faith and none which are intrinsic to belief in the metaphysical, transcendent, etc.

Given that I am not a believer, the best available acceptable tool for me to use to combat the regressive uses of faith and religion (which is how religions and faith have typically been expressed across history) is to appeal to science as the best approach to learning about the world. This strategy has the added value of the fact the this /is/ the best approach to learning about the world, at least in comparison to appeals to faith in the unknown and unprovable.

Basically, my message is believe whatever religion you want but science should rule our collective approaches to the mega-crises I fear. I feel the same way about “lesser” order social problems like crime and family stability, but that is a separate issue.

I will work through some of the other points raised by other participants in this discussion as I can. For now I have faith I’ve added fuel to the discussion.

Trond

Matt J Stannard said...

I will definitely have more to say about this but I'd love for Scott to chime in as well, and any other of the ten or so people who read my blog. But for now, I just want to quote Trond in agreement:

"Basically, my message is believe whatever religion you want but science should rule our collective approaches to the mega-crises I fear. I feel the same way about “lesser” order social problems like crime and family stability, but that is a separate issue."

Yeah I pretty much believe this too.

matt

Anonymous said...

Trond,

A few quick responses to your broader argument, as well as to some of the details.

Premise #1: “Humans face problems that threaten the continuation of life as we know it.” We don’t disagree on that (though we might disagree on the severity, immediacy, or priority of such problems, not to mention solutions).

Premise #2: “The problems can only be solved by science.” This seems like a controversial premise--especially when we consider the source of the problems you identified. Climate change? Blame science. Ocean die-off? Blame science. Space weaponization? Industrial pollution? Blame science. There’s an irony in your faith (and it is just that) that only science can save us from the problems it has created. Perhaps the more rational reaction is to let go of the myth that the advance of science is an unqualified good and go back to a darker age where our knowledge limited our ability to destroy ourselves. I’m not advocating that position. But I don’t think it’s any less sensible than the “fight fire with fire” approach to the potentially catastrophic byproducts of science’s progress.

Premise #3: “We’re on the brink of theocracy, which is destructive to the application of sound science.” This seems hyperbolic, if not simply false. The United States is not on the brink or even in the ballpark of theocracy, under any ordinary definition of the term. And, while most public officials purport to be more or less religious, how is that impacting the application of sound science? More specifically, how is religious belief among elected officials an obstacle to the rational assessment of and response to the problems you enumerated in Premise 1? I’m not seeing the connection.

Conclusion (#4-6): “We need less religion and more secularism and science.” If we grant your controversial second and third premises, that gets us closer to this conclusion. But it doesn’t necessarily carry us home. There’s an unstated premise in your argument:

Premise #0: “All problems that can be solved by science *should* be solved by science.”

And that is an unempirical, unscientific, unverifiable judgment. Is it a universally obvious one? Hardly. People routinely disagree on what problems should be solved and how. And, prior to that, the very notion of a “problem” implies normative judgments. “Problems” don’t exist in nature. The potential extinction of wombats, woodpeckers, or men doesn’t ruffle the serene repose of the Cosmos or Being or whatever you want to call all that exists. “Problems” are deeply anthropocentric. And people often disagree on what constitutes a problem, particularly when divergent interests are at stake. Science is of no use on this terrain.

So, my question for you is, If problematization is inherently normative, don’t morals trump science?

-------

Okay, skipping ahead to another portion of your most recent post, you again reassert (though I look forward to your argument) that religious belief is exogenous to its occasionally salutary effects. You then state:

“1) These are all merely the products of human belief and faith; none are true or provable or facts (however you want to look at this), unlike say predictions about orbits or the nutrient cycles of polar oceans.

“2) Stripped of the power of being 'True,' or 'His Word' or whatever, and properly reduced to status as mere instrument of human belief, a valid question becomes what is the veracity of their content and how applicable is it to solving problem X?”

This approach strikes me as naive, both about religion and science. Accurate predictions of many orbits were made long before “modern science,” even though the underlying theories (e.g., concentric spheres, epicyclic orbits, a geocentric universe, etc.) are now believed to be false. Kepler took it to another level, with the theory that the orbits were actually elliptical. Newton then showed that orbits were conic sections and concocted a productive theory of gravitation, better explaining eccentric orbits. We now know that, despite the impressive results his theory produced, Newtonian gravitation is false. These changes in theory--in metaphysics--over time were not gradual, incremental, or evolutionary. They were radical and revolutionary. The history of science is replete with productive theories based on substances, forces, or entities now believed not to exist (e.g., phlogiston, caloric, luminiferous aether, the humors, action at a distance, et al.).

As Quine (who was very sympathetic to scientism) put it in his well-known “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” “As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries--not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. Let me interject that for my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits.”

So, first, you have to get over the hurdle of problematization’s normative nature. Second, you have to make the case for scientific realism, if you’re going to distinguish science from religion on the basis you’ve just described. That’s a tall order.

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Jumping ahead one last time, you write, “False beliefs are no less so even when they motivate positive action.”

Yes and so what? Doctors use placebos because they work. There is a scientifically verifiable benefit to holding false beliefs in some circumstances. I’m not saying that religious beliefs are false (though I think many are). But if they’re demonstrably connected to desirable outcomes, who cares?

You then ask, “When this occurs within a religious context, what are the productive outcomes intrinsic to faith? For example, could not these very values emerge in the collective of a workers’ council or whatever? What are the essential *religious* contributions?”

There are at least two ways to answer this:

Way #1. Productive outcomes, such as they are, are usually inextricably connected with the content of the faith. Within a Judeo-Christian context, believers often undertake or forego a variety of actions on the basis of the perception of God’s will or commands, often backstopped by promises of rewards and punishment. You know, basic B.F. Skinner stuff. The questions many religious believers ask (and to which atheists usually offer no satisfactory answer) are: If God isn’t the basis of right and wrong, what (if anything) is? If death is the end and there are no consequences for our actions (if we’re clever enough to cover our tracks), why should we do the right thing, even if we knew what it was? There may or may not be good answers to such questions. But the point is, the specific content of belief is largely responsible for believers’ motivation to action, whether progressive (as it often is) or regressive. Just ask them.

Way #2. By their fruits, ye shall know them. In my experience, religion motivates people in a way that voluntary secular organizations generally do not. I doubt my experience is unique, as the very blog entry that precipitated this discussion was Matt’s entry about “Religionists Gone Wild!” There are occasionally some hard-charging secularists. But, for the most part, they’re not living and breathing “the Cause.” They may talk a good game. They may throw a few bucks to this or that group. But it doesn’t call, consume, or drive them the way religion does to those in its thrall. So, maybe there *could* be a really gung-ho, movin’ and shakin’ workers’ council. But the fact that such organizations don’t often exist suggests that it just may not be in the cards--that they require some metaphysical wherewithal to ever get off the ground.

Scott